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Abstract. EugeneWigner’s much discussed notion of the “unreasonable effectiveness
of mathematics” in describing the physics of empirical reality is simultaneously both
trivial and profound. After all, the relevant mathematics was, (in the first instance),
originally developed in order to be useful in describing empirical reality. On the
other hand, certain aspects of the mathematical superstructure have now taken on
a life of their own, with at least some features of the mathematical superstructure
greatly exceeding anything that can be directly probed or verified, or even justified, by
empirical experiment. Specifically, I wish to raise the possibility that the real number
system, (with its nevertheless pragmatically very useful tools of real analysis, and
mathematically rigorous notions of differentiation and integration), may nevertheless
constitute a “wrong turn” when it comes to modelling empirical reality. Without
making any definitive recommendation, I shall discuss several alternatives.
Keywords: Mathematical physics; number systems; rational numbers; real numbers;
integration; differentiation.
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Based on an essay written for the FQXi 2012 essay contest:
“Questioning the foundations. Which of our basic physical assumptions are wrong?”
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1. Introduction
Half a century ago Eugene Wigner introduced the idea of the “unreasonable effectiveness
of mathematics” [1] when it comes to describing the physics of empirical reality — this
is an extremely tricky issue that bears repeated re-examination. There are definitely
very many powerful assumptions built into modern mathematics, and specifically that
part of mathematics used for investigating physics, and only some of these assumptions
can be asserted to be solidly based on direct empirical input. While the many and
varied successes of modern physics clearly indicate we are doing something right, the
very fact that there is also a long list of things that we do not know how to do (both
in physics and mathematics) suggests that we might wish to double check for possible
“wrong turns” in the development of the status quo.
2. Pre-calculus
When studying pre-calculus mathematics one encounters an extremely natural
progression of number systems:
• Counting numbers, {1, 2, 3, . . .};
• Natural numbers, {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .};
• Integers, {. . . ,−3,−2,−1, 0,+1,+2,+3, . . .};
• Rational numbers;
• Real numbers;
• Complex numbers.
The first three stages in this progression, (the counting numbers, natural numbers,
and integers), are extremely closely tied to empirical reality, essentially just being
mathematical formalizations of the physical notion of the existence of discrete and
separate objects in the observable universe. (Though even then, the implicit notion
of infinity hiding in these number systems might give some people pause for concern.)
However, already once one moves to the rational numbers, (while no-one should
dispute the usefulness of the resulting mathematics), there is a very real and nontrivial
question as to how closely they model empirical reality. Since the rational numbers
are “infinitely divisible”, if one uses the rationals to model space and time, then one is
making very strong physical assumptions regarding the empirical physical structure of
space-time, effectively, that there is an infinitely divisible space-time.
Viewed in hindsight, (and with a modern change of terminology), that no-one
was too worried about this issue for several millennia can be inferred from the fact
that Euclid’s axioms [2] of geometry explicitly allowed for “infinitely divisible” line
segments, (and so implicitly allowed, at the very least, what might now be called
“rational-coordinate Cartesian geometry”). Of course Euclid’s axioms assert much more
than this, naturally leading to number systems considerably more complicated than the
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rationals, but still simpler than the reals — and I will have much more to say about
this later.
3. Calculus
Much more recently, somewhat over 300 years ago, Newton [3] and Leibniz [4] developed
the differential and integral calculus as general purpose mathematical tools. (The
calculus was developed largely for calculating slopes and volumes — thereby extending
the “method of exhaustion” developed by the ancient Greeks [5, 6]; and also for the
extremely practical purpose of predicting planetary orbits). Putting these pragmatic
tools on a rigourous footing, (as Berkeley asked: “What, pray tell, are these differentials,
these ghosts of departed quantities?” [7]), took well over a century, and led Dedekind,
Cauchy, Weirstrauss, and numerous others to develop and codify the real number
system — with its associated theory of real analysis and mathematically rigourous
theories of differentiation and integration [8, 9, 10]. No-one can reasonably doubt the
pragmatic effectiveness (the possibly “unreasonable effectiveness”) of real analysis [1]
— just consider the theory of ordinary and partial differential equations, the associated
existence and uniqueness results, and the vast body of mathematical physics that has
grown up over the last few centuries — almost all of which is based on straightforward
application of real analysis (or its offspring, complex analysis).
But, and this is a very big but, the very successfulness of real analysis relies upon the
fact that the real number system is a mathematical idealization, (not a physical model),
that is by that stage very far removed from empirical reality of how one might actually
make measurements, and so is very far removed from experimental verifiability. How,
pray tell, might one go about experimentally verifying the implicit claim underlying
the use of real analysis in physics — the implicit claim that the measurements made
by physical clocks and rulers are adequately characterized by the real number system?
(And more subtly, the implicit claim that one needs the entire real number system to
adequately characterize physical measurements.)
4. Other number systems
Closely related to this question is the fact, (typically ignored in the training of most
physicists), that there is a whole hierarchy of number systems lying between the rational
numbers and the real numbers, and that it might be that one of these other number
systems has more claim to be operationally relevant to physics.
Some of the other number systems are:
• The field of quadratic surds,
(q1 +
√
q2, where q1 and q2 are rational);
• Constructible numbers,
(constructible in Euclidean geometry using straight-edge and compass);
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• Algebraic numbers,
(built from the roots of integer coefficient polynomials);
• Computable numbers [recursive numbers, computable reals],
(a computable number c can be approximated to arbitrary specified rational
accuracy ǫ with a rational number q generated by some computable function: so
q = f(c, ǫ) with |c− f(c, ǫ)| < ǫ);
• Definable numbers [first-order definable without parameters],
(a definable number is set theoretically definable as the quantity that makes some
set-theoretic function “true”).
These particular number fields all share the property of being countable; while they
all extend the rationals, their cardinality is the same as the rationals, and by Cantor’s
diagonalization argument their cardinality is less than that of the reals — in this sense
they are closer to the rationals than the reals. (And in this sense the possible use of
such number systems would be an aspect of the great modern divide between “discrete”
and “continuum” mathematics; in physics language consider the “discretium” versus
the “continuum”.) One might hope, (though at this stage it is little more than a rather
pious hope), that the reduced cardinality might in some way simplify life.
5. The “best” number system?
Could any of these number systems be “better” than the reals when it comes to doing
physics? Is any one of them clearly superior to the others? Ultimately this is an entirely
pragmatic question that depends on various trade-offs — in particular how much of
standard real analysis survives in these smaller number systems? Does one have, or can
one construct, good notions of integration and differentiation? Alternatively, instead of
the usual theory of differential equations, can one at the very least develop a coherent
theory of finite difference equations over these number systems?
Overall, the situation is very much less than clear, and I will not provide any specific
definitive answers — there are several abstract mathematical attempts at developing
alternatives to real analysis, but I will leave technical details as an exercise for one’s
favourite search engine — at this stage I wish merely to raise suitable questions, and to
encourage some thought along these lines. Specifically, there is a certain lack of clarity
as to which of these number systems to focus on, and the physics community might
most profitably contribute to the discussion by developing some consensus as to the
minimum requirements for a physically acceptable number system.
For instance, it is periodically mooted that one could get away with only using the
rational numbers — but there is an extremely high price to pay for this, which is maybe
just too high — if one naively asserts that all lengths (or more precisely length ratios)
are describable by rational numbers then one already has excluded the
{
1, 1,
√
2
}
right-
angled triangle from the physical universe (and so has implicitly eliminated 45 degree
angles from the physical universe). This observation (suitably repackaged) essentially
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goes back to the ancient Pythagorean proof of the irrationality of
√
2, and does seem
to suggest that, (if one first accepts the rationals themselves as being “physical”), then
something beyond the rationals would be a good idea. More precisely, this would seem
to focus attention on the constructible numbers.
However, even then, one has to decide precisely which construction techniques are
allowable. For instance, with marked edge and compass, (as opposed to straight edge
and compass), it is well-known that one can trisect arbitrary angles [11], and also double
the cube [12]. (One could also use Origami techniques to trisect arbitrary angles and to
double the cube [13].) In a similar vein, if one is allowed to mark the edge of a circle, and
roll it along a straight line, (thus employing a surveyor’s wheel/hodometer/waywiser),
then constructing two line segments whose lengths are in the ratio π is trivial. Such a
procedure is implicit in Archimedes theorem that the area of a circle equals the area of
a right angled triangle whose base is the circumference of the circle and whose height is
the radius of the circle. Once this preliminary step is done then one certainly can square
the circle. The point is that exactly which set of constructible numbers one obtains very
much depends on a precise specification of the allowed construction techniques.
6. Empirical guidance?
Perhaps more operationally, any physical experiment can be viewed as a finite-resource
algorithm applied to the universe that returns some finite-precision result; and any
finite-precision number can be viewed as a rational number. This point of view would
suggest the relevance of the computable number system, or possibly some sub-sector
thereof. (One may wish to think carefully as to whether all computable functions can
be simulated by physical experiments, or whether physical experiments only probe a
subset of the computable functions. One might also wish to think carefully on the
ultimate limits of precision of the experimental method.)
Of course there are yet other possibilities:
• As very briefly outlined above, one could try to construct yet more number systems,
“between” the rationals and the reals.
• If one is deeply offended by any notion of infinity, then even a countable number
system might be too much to contemplate — one could always resort to finite fields
(Galois fields [14]), but one would have to choose an awfully big finite field.
(Since the ratio of the Planck length to the Hubble scale is ≈ 1060, each spacetime
coordinate would presumably lie in some number system with & 1060 distinct
elements.)
• If one even objects to using mathematical number fields, then there are always
finite geometries to play with, or more abstractly finite matroids [15].
(With, in 4 spacetime dimensions, & (1060)4 = 10240 distinct points or elements
respectively — though the very concept of a finite matroid with & 10240 distinct
elements is likely to seriously perturb several of my colleagues.)
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• In the other direction one could go to an extreme even larger than the reals — such
as the hyper-reals of nonstandard analysis [16].
Of course this is moving even further afield from empirical reality, (or more precisely,
further from things one can think of measuring directly), so most physicists would
demand very good reasons — some very high payoff — for moving in such a
direction.
• I should also (extremely briefly) mention the p-adics. Let us just say that their
direct connection to empirical reality seems to be a little strained [17].
I emphasise that one of the key distinctions we can make is between number systems of
finite (but large) cardinality, countable cardinality, and uncountable cardinality.
7. Discussion
The much discussed “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” in describing empirical
reality [1] is subject to a number of significant caveats — exactly which particular
aspect of mathematics is it that is so unreasonably effective? There are several distinct
mathematical frameworks [number systems] that might plausibly be used to model
empirical reality, and given the current state of affairs physicists can still reasonably
agree to differ on which is “best”. My personal judgment of the most likely place
to look is this: The jump from rationals to reals, though mathematically very well
motivated, might not physically be the most appropriate step to take. There are many
number systems intermediate in strength between the rationals and the reals, and one
of these intermediate number systems, (most probably one of countable cardinality),
might plausibly provide a better way of modelling empirical reality. Physically these
questions become interesting if and only if one can develop a compelling mathematical
alternative to real analysis (in particular, to classical differentiation and integration)
that is powerful enough to allow us to do interesting things, but (hopefully) is simple
enough, and different enough, to lead to compelling new physics. There is a rich vein of
interesting ideas here, one to which both mathematicians and physicists could usefully
contribute.
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